My main area of research lies in the intersection between philosophy of language, epistemology and meta-normativity. I am currently working on the normative dimension of our rational agency and thought, and of our linguistic practices. More specifically, I investigate the defeasible nature of our reasons for belief and action, and its possible implications for debates about rationality, justification or higher-order evidence. In particular, I am working on cases of self-doubt induced by misleading higher-order evidence. I want to argue that, in these cases, the misleading higher-order evidence defeats the agent's epistemic standing by undermining her access to some of her original first-order reasons. I am also interested in the diverging behavior of reasons for belief and for action. Moreover, I have further interests in related topics in meta-ethics, philosophy of language and mind, philosophy of science and aesthetics.
The aim of my PhD dissertation (“Inference and Action: Relating Beliefs to the World”) was to explore practice-based accounts of representation. More specifically, it investigates whether it is possible to characterize in non-representational terms what it takes for a given practice to count as representational, i.e. as a practice involving states or acts that answer to the way the world is. The approach I adopt is broadly in line with the kind of ‘pragmatist’ tradition to which the work of Wittgenstein and Sellars, and more recently Robert Brandom and Huw Price belong.
This research has led me to focus on the study of defeasible reasoning and the context-sensitivity it introduces in rational agency and thought. I am currently investigating the consequences of the defeseability of our reasoning for different debates in epistemology, metaethics and philosophy of language. My aim is to explore what picture of rationality, justification and good reasoning emerges once the defeasibility of our reasons is fully taken into account. I want to argue that paying attention to the defeasibility of reason-following allows one to develop an attractive externalist account of the normative constraints regulating the lives of rational beings, while respecting the intuitions motivating internalist theories. One question I am especially interested in is whether the normative features of epistemic and practical reasons differ (for instance, can epistemic and practical reasons be defeated in the same ways?).
A second strand of my research project addresses the normative structure of our linguistic practices. I am interested in the normative dynamics of language use, in particular of evaluative discourse and other forms of assertoric speech that have been regarded as non-descriptive (e.g. aesthetic discourse, modals, conditionals). I want to investigate what normative mechanisms govern such areas of discourse, and how they contribute to the achievement of intersubjective coordination. I have already done some work on metaphorical speech (‘Metaphor and engaged coordination’) and, more broadly, on the normative constrainsts of aesthetic language (‘Recommending beauty’). I am currently working on evaluative assertions generally (‘Relativism and the expressivist divide’). The thesis I want to explore is that, in this type of discourse, speakers resort to the normative mechanisms of assertoric speech acts in order to promote the interpersonal attunement of attitudes. More specifically, assertions of incompatible contents give rise to normative pressures that impel the speakers to align their views – assertoric disagreement is an instable position that calls for revision. In domains where interpersonal attunement is valuable, it makes sense to employ assertoric speech, even when one’s aim is not primarily to describe the world. I want to argue that a relativistic model of assertion (MacFarlane 2014) manages to characterize the dynamics of these non-descriptive uses of assertoric speech.
In developing these projects, I have worked in a number of topics in different areas, including epistemology, meta-ethics and philosophy of science. One specific question I am especially interested in is the biological grounding of representational practices and, more generally, of normativity (not only from the perspective of Millikan’s telosemantics, but also of alternative organizational/enactivist approaches).
The aim of my PhD dissertation (“Inference and Action: Relating Beliefs to the World”) was to explore practice-based accounts of representation. More specifically, it investigates whether it is possible to characterize in non-representational terms what it takes for a given practice to count as representational, i.e. as a practice involving states or acts that answer to the way the world is. The approach I adopt is broadly in line with the kind of ‘pragmatist’ tradition to which the work of Wittgenstein and Sellars, and more recently Robert Brandom and Huw Price belong.
This research has led me to focus on the study of defeasible reasoning and the context-sensitivity it introduces in rational agency and thought. I am currently investigating the consequences of the defeseability of our reasoning for different debates in epistemology, metaethics and philosophy of language. My aim is to explore what picture of rationality, justification and good reasoning emerges once the defeasibility of our reasons is fully taken into account. I want to argue that paying attention to the defeasibility of reason-following allows one to develop an attractive externalist account of the normative constraints regulating the lives of rational beings, while respecting the intuitions motivating internalist theories. One question I am especially interested in is whether the normative features of epistemic and practical reasons differ (for instance, can epistemic and practical reasons be defeated in the same ways?).
A second strand of my research project addresses the normative structure of our linguistic practices. I am interested in the normative dynamics of language use, in particular of evaluative discourse and other forms of assertoric speech that have been regarded as non-descriptive (e.g. aesthetic discourse, modals, conditionals). I want to investigate what normative mechanisms govern such areas of discourse, and how they contribute to the achievement of intersubjective coordination. I have already done some work on metaphorical speech (‘Metaphor and engaged coordination’) and, more broadly, on the normative constrainsts of aesthetic language (‘Recommending beauty’). I am currently working on evaluative assertions generally (‘Relativism and the expressivist divide’). The thesis I want to explore is that, in this type of discourse, speakers resort to the normative mechanisms of assertoric speech acts in order to promote the interpersonal attunement of attitudes. More specifically, assertions of incompatible contents give rise to normative pressures that impel the speakers to align their views – assertoric disagreement is an instable position that calls for revision. In domains where interpersonal attunement is valuable, it makes sense to employ assertoric speech, even when one’s aim is not primarily to describe the world. I want to argue that a relativistic model of assertion (MacFarlane 2014) manages to characterize the dynamics of these non-descriptive uses of assertoric speech.
In developing these projects, I have worked in a number of topics in different areas, including epistemology, meta-ethics and philosophy of science. One specific question I am especially interested in is the biological grounding of representational practices and, more generally, of normativity (not only from the perspective of Millikan’s telosemantics, but also of alternative organizational/enactivist approaches).
