ABSTRACT  The paper offers a semantic and pragmatic analysis of statements of the form ‘x is beautiful’ as involving a double speech act: first, a report that x is beautiful relative to the speaker’s aesthetic standard, along the lines of naive contextualism; second, the speaker’s recommendation that her audience comes to share her appraisal of x as beautiful. We suggest that attributions of beauty tend to convey such a recommendation due to the role that aesthetic practices play in fostering and enhancing interpersonal coordination. Aesthetic practices are driven by a disposition towards the attunement of attitudes and aesthetic recommendations contribute to forwarding such attunement. Our view is motivated by an attempt to satisfy the following set of desiderata: to account for (i) the experiential nature of aesthetic judgments, (ii) disagreements in aesthetic debates, and (iii) the normative aspirations of aesthetic discourse, as well as to avoid appealing to (iv) error theory and (v) realist ontological commitments.

KEYWORDS: beauty; normativity; disagreement; contextualism; recommendation; assertion.
On the face of it, one may think that the semantic analysis of aesthetic predicates such as ‘beautiful’ or ‘elegant’ should mirror well-studied cases of predicates of personal taste, such as ‘tasty’ or ‘fun’. Yet, despite similarities, the two classes of predicates seem to come apart. Arguably, aesthetic assertions have a normative, universal dimension that is not present (at least not to the same extent) in judgments of personal taste. It has been argued, as early as by Kant, that one ‘speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things’, and so does not assert ‘merely for himself, but for everyone’ (Kant [1790] 2000: vol. 5, 213); see also Zangwill 2003).¹ This initial characterization may suggest that aesthetic predicates and predicates of personal taste exhibit different features.

In this paper, we focus on the semantic and pragmatic analysis of ‘beautiful’, as the central aesthetic concept, discussing unqualified assertions of the form ‘x is beautiful’. As when giving a semantic account of predicates of personal taste, we will aim at a proper understanding of the standards relative to which the given predicate is being ascribed. In particular, although everyone arguably possesses such a standard, we need to answer which standard we use when assessing the beauty of a given object. Is there a single standard to which all attributions of beauty are indexed, e.g., the standard of an ideal critic (Hume [1757] 1985)?; or is the standard better viewed as one shared by privileged members of a community, such as experts (Recanati 2008)? Alternatively, is such a standard common to the participants of the conversation (DeRose 2004), or can it be different from one speaker to another?²

We start by discussing an invariantist semantics for beauty attributions, in Section II, trying to motivate a departure from such a view. In Section III, we introduce a

---

¹ Citations from Kant’s texts refer to volume and page numbers in the Akademie edition.
² A critical discussion of the individualized indexical contextualism applied to beauty attributions can be found in Baker (2012).
contextualist alternative and discuss its problems in accounting for disagreement and the normative dimension of aesthetic judgment. In Section IV, we go on to critically assess Recanati’s attempt of accounting for such a normative dimension. Section V develops our positive proposal. It attempts to satisfy the following set of desiderata: to explain (1) the experiential nature of aesthetic judgment (what we will call its first-handness), (2) its normative dimension and (3) aesthetic disagreements; in so doing, we try to respect two further guidelines: to avoid both (4) an error theory as well as (5) unwarranted realist commitments. That being said, while (1)-(3) are discussed in detail, (4) and (5) are rough ‘methodological’ principles we will mention more sporadically. The view we defend is that attributions of beauty typically involve two speech acts, an assertion and a recommendation. Finally, in Section VI, we explain why such recommendations are being made, suggesting that they enhance group coordination and bonding.

II. Response-dependence and the objection from testimony

A number of authors have proposed dispositional, response-dependent characterization of evaluative properties, often inspired by the model of secondary qualities such as color (see Lewis 1989; McDowell 1998; López de Sa 2010; Marques and García-Carpintero 2014). On this proposal, one and the same object may possess different evaluative properties in relation to different subjects because it may produce different responses in different observers. This accords with our intuitions about attributions of at least some evaluative properties: it may be that artichokes are tasty for me but not for you.

Of course, this need not be so. Questions about value may have a unique, perspective-independent answer even within a response-dependent framework. This will happen when the extension of the relevant property is determined by the actual responses
of some privileged set of observers. Think of the case of color: let us grant that for something to be blue, it is essential that it has the disposition to look in a certain way for perceptually normal humans (as they actually are), in standard conditions of illumination. Accordingly, whether something is blue will not depend on possible idiosyncratic perspectives of subjects who attribute or evaluate the property but lack normal vision. In fact, color-blind people may talk about objects having certain colors as long as these objects produce the relevant response in perceptually normal individuals. This means that people who cannot recognize colors can still rely on the testimony of people with normal vision.

This leaves us with the question whether the analysis of ‘beautiful’ should be modeled more closely to the semantics of ‘tasty’ or that of ‘blue’. On an invariantist framework (for instance, Schafer 2011), the truth value of propositions attributing beauty does not depend on the specific responsive dispositions of the agent, either that making the statement or evaluating it. Instead, beauty is understood as a perspective-invariant property. Yet, from the semantic point of view, invariantism is far from convincing.

II.i. The testimony argument

Since the invariantist takes both ‘blue’ and ‘beautiful’ to pick out perspective-invariant properties, it would be reasonable for her to expect that testimonial practices work similarly in these two cases. However, they seem to be disanalogous: while we are typically not disinclined to make statements about colors solely on the basis of testimony, we seem to be far more cautious in making the analogous assertions about beauty.

A number of authors have argued that the role of testimony in beauty attributions is far more limited than in attributions of properties such as being blue (Wollheim 1980; Pettit 1983; Todd 2004; Whiting 2015). One way of explaining this disanalogy is by appealing
to the experiential nature of beauty attributions: in order for an individual to be in a position to attribute beauty to some object, the thought goes, she has to be experientially acquainted with that object, as well as (be disposed to) have the required response (Pettit 1983; Wollheim 1980; Todd 2004; for discussion see Robson 2012 and Budd 2003). Consequently, attributing beauty while denying acquaintance with the object seems *prima facie* absurd in a Moorean sense:

1. A is beautiful, but I have never perceived A.

That is to say, one may think that the assertion of the first conjunct presupposes precisely what is denied by the second conjunct.

The same feature can be found in other areas of response-dependent discourse, such as speech about food: in order to attribute tastiness to artichokes, one must try them first (see MacFarlane 2014: ch. 1 and 7). Call such a feature of aesthetic judgment *first-handness*.

As pointed out above, we rely on testimony in the case of colors, which are response-dependent but perspective-independent properties (on a plausible account). I may be warranted in asserting that your kitchen table is blue, even if I haven’t seen it, provided that your testimony was reliable. By contrast, one may argue that in general I need to *see* your table in order to (be warranted to) assert that it is beautiful. Your testimony, in this particular case, will only allow me to say that *you* think the table is beautiful, or that it is *likely* that I may find it beautiful, since you said it was and you have good taste. But stronger claims, it seems, are not appropriate.

These constraints on testimony-based aesthetic judgments put pressure on invariantism. On the invariantist picture, there do not seem to be obvious reasons against
relying generally on second-hand evidence, such as the testimony of reliable peers. If a reliable peer attributes a perspective-invariant property to some object, then why should not other individuals be generally willing to attribute that property on the basis of the peer’s testimony?

Schafer acknowledges that these limitations on aesthetic testimony are a potential problem for invariantism. In response, he tries to vindicate the role played by testimony in aesthetic judgments, claiming that the testimony of experts may lead us to reassess our appreciation of some artwork (Schafer 2011). Schafer’s reply, however, fails to undermine the first-handness of aesthetic judgments. For, reassessing our appreciation of an artwork presupposes we have already appreciated it; thus, it would still not be shown that this initial appreciation does not require experience of the relevant object.

The invariantist may try to explain the limitations on aesthetic testimony by appealing to a great variability in aesthetic judgments across individuals. This variability would give us reasons to remain cautious about the reliability of other individuals as assessors of beauty and thereby not to trust their aesthetic testimony. A problem for this kind of approach is that it seems to lead either to aesthetic skepticism or to some form of aesthetic epistemic chauvinism (both of which seem undesirable): if the aesthetic assessments of others are so unreliable, why should anyone think one is in a better position to get aesthetic matters right? So, if we want to avoid an unjustified epistemic egocentrism, it seems that we should be sceptical about our own reliability as aesthetic judges as well.
However, this is problematic, as we are often rather confident about our own aesthetic judgments and take ourselves to be perfectly entitled to make them.³

Since it is not easy to accommodate a limited role for aesthetic testimony within an invariantist framework, it seems that the invariantist needs to show that it is generally possible to judge an artwork to be beautiful relying solely on the testimony of others. Unless it is shown that testimony can actually play such a generalized evidential role (or it is explained why this is not the case) aesthetic invariantism will remain under pressure. To the best of our knowledge, invariantists have not given a satisfactory answer to these worries. These considerations, in our view, give a strong motivation (albeit not a knock-down argument) for exploring alternative approaches,⁴ the task we turn to in the following sections.

### III. A contextualist semantics

The first-handness of judgments attributing response-dependent properties can be straightforwardly explained by taking these judgments to be perspective-sensitive.⁵ The relevant proposition would be true only if the object has the disposition to elicit the required response in the judge— in other words, only if the object has the relevant property relative to the standards or sensibility of the judge (Sundell 2011; Baker 2012; Marques and García-³

---

³ This argument against invariantism is developed in MacFarlane (2007: 17); also, MacFarlane (2014: Ch. 1); see Schafer (2011) for discussion.
⁴ Further motivation is provided by the pervasiveness of radical, persistent disagreement about aesthetic matters (see Schafer 2011 for discussion).
⁵ A further source of context-sensitivity is related to the gradability of the adjective ‘beautiful’, and its dependence on relevant comparison classes: e.g., some painting may be beautiful-as-painted-by-a-child but not beautiful-as-painted-by-a-MOMA-artist. We will not discuss this sort of context-sensitivity here.
Typically, an individual has to be experientially acquainted with an object in order to be in a position to know whether such an object is disposed to elicit the required response in her (especially so given that aesthetic responses exhibit great variability across individuals and can be highly idiosyncratic). Consequently, the proponent of this account would not seem to face problems in accounting for first-handness and the limited role of testimony in attributions of beauty.

Yet, in some cases, it might be argued that other individuals can be reliable guides about our own aesthetic responses. Although such cases seem to be rare, they are nonetheless conceivable. Imagine, for instance, two cinema aficionados who perfectly agree in their evaluations of each of the movies of a certain director. Insofar as one of the aficionados can inductively infer from their past agreements that they will keep agreeing in their responses in new cases, it seems that she will be in a position to learn about her own aesthetic dispositions towards the director’s new movie merely on the basis of the judgment of the other aficionado. Accordingly, the perspective-sensitive view just introduced should accept testimony-based aesthetic judgments in this sort of situations. Is this a bad consequence for these views? We think not, because it is actually plausible that aesthetic testimony would be appropriate in these peculiar cases (were they to happen). At any rate, it is important to observe that this sort of situation would be exceptional. It seems that in most cases only first-hand experience puts us in a position to find out about our aesthetic

---

6 By aesthetic sensibility, we refer to the disposition to have certain aesthetic responses. Aesthetic sensibilities determine aesthetic standards – that is, standards according to which agents with such a sensibility evaluate objects.

7 Given the occasion-sensitive nature of aesthetic appreciation, it may seem unlikely that such an inductive inference is ever actually warranted in real-life situations: due to the high idiosyncrasy of personal aesthetic dispositions, it seems that it is always a relevant possibility that past synchronicity won’t carry over to new cases.
responses to a given object. Invariantism, in contrast, seems to predict that the acceptability
of testimony-based aesthetic judgments should be far more widespread.

A standard way of modelling aesthetic perspective-sensitivity is by means of a
contextualist semantics for aesthetic judgments (Sundell 2011; Baker 2012; Marques and
García-Carpintero 2014). On this view, sentences attributing beauty express different
contents in relation to different speakers: the content expressed includes a parameter
referring to the standards of the experiencer. For example, an utterance of ‘Whistler’s
Nocturne in blue and green is beautiful’ would express the following content:

2. Whistler’s Nocturne in blue and green is beautiful (relative to the aesthetic
standards of the speaker).

According to an alternative, relativist view, the contents expressed by different utterances
of ‘Whistler’s Nocturne in blue and green is beautiful’ remain the same, but their truth-
value depends on the standard against which it is evaluated (Kölbel 2004; Lasersohn 2005;
MacFarlane 2014). In the remainder of the paper, however, we will leave relativist
proposals aside,\(^8\) and will focus instead on contextualist approaches.

The proposed contextualist analysis faces at least two type of worries. First,
assuming that the aesthetic standards of different speakers are sufficiently divergent, our
account may end up admitting as correct just about any aesthetic evaluation of a given
object. Intuitively, this may strike one as a wrong result: on Zangwill’s view, ‘there are

\(^8\) Although we offer a contextualist account, a parallel approach can be pursued within the relativist
framework. Relativism is a radical theory that involves the revision of basic notions such as truth. So,
all things equal, a contextualist proposal will be more conservative than a relativist one. It is
interesting, therefore, to see whether a satisfactory account of aesthetic predicates may be given
without having to endorse a revisionary relativist project. For general worries about the coherence of
relativism, see Marques (2014).
some [aesthetic] judgments that we ought to make and some that we ought not to make. It is not the case that 'anything goes’ (Zangwill 2003: 68). Along similar lines, Kant ([1790] 2000: vol. 32, 281) highlighted the universal dimension of aesthetic judgments, claiming that a judgment attributing beauty ‘makes a claim to everyone's assent, as if it were an objective’ [judgment]. It is not obvious how our contextualist can account for such normative aspirations of aesthetic discourse. Second, if every aesthetic judgment is evaluated relative to the speaker’s standards, two people offering opposite aesthetic appraisals may both turn out to be right. Yet, most of us find the intuition behind genuine disagreements over aesthetic properties to be quite robust. The contextualist faces difficulties in accounting for such disagreements.

There are different contextualist strategies for addressing these two challenges— even if they are not without problems. Instead of discussing the success and comparative merits of each of these strategies, we will put forward our own proposal, which aims to capture the normative dimension of aesthetic judgment while preserving a contextualist spirit. Before doing so, in order to set the stage for the introduction of our positive view, we will consider a particular contextualist attempt to account for disagreement and normativity, proposed by Recanati.

IV. Recanati’s analysis

---

9 Of course, a speaker can be mistaken about her own evaluation: for instance, she may be distracted or fail to pay attention to all the relevant features of the object assessed.

10 For instance, Björnsson and Almér (2009; 2010) argue that sometimes disagreement does not target the content literally asserted, but rather the satisfaction of some other condition made salient by the utterance; Plunkett and Sundell (2013; also Sundell 2011), on the other hand, analyze evaluative disagreements as a form of meta-semantic disagreement about what standards are contextually relevant; López de Sa (2015) claims that the relevant disagreement is in non-doXastic attitudes and that expressions of disagreement typically rely on presuppositions of shared standards.

11 For a critical assessment of some of these proposals, see Marques (2015).
Recanati proposes a way of addressing the two worries mentioned above. On his view, “‘It is beautiful’ means something like *It is beautiful for us*, that is, for the community to which the speaker and his audience belong’ (Recanati 2008: 58). On this proposal, aesthetic judgments are not evaluated relative to the standard of an individual, but rather to the standard of the relevant community. This maneuver manages to introduce a larger degree of normativity and universality, as well as account for the possibility of aesthetic (non-faultless) disagreement. For, two individuals from the same community may disagree in their aesthetic judgments due to their attributing different standards to their community: in relation to the actual standards of their community, only one of them (at best) will be judging correctly.

How is such a communal standard to be fleshed out on Recanati’s view? Quite clearly, it cannot be viewed as a mere aggregation of the community members’ standards: in most, if not all, cases, there would be no univocal communal standard to begin with. In addition, a given individual could dissent from the shared view and proclaim her judgment as correct. It would be likewise problematic to fix the standard in terms of the majority of the community. It seems that the most promising strategy is to appeal—as Recanati suggests—to a privileged group within the community, the experts or critics,\(^\text{12}\) in line with Hume’s proposal of accounting for the normativity of aesthetic judgments in terms of the views of ideal observers (for critical discussion, see Zangwill 2003). Yet, this strategy is not without its own problems.

First, observe that Recanati faces the following dilemma: either (i) the speech act made by uttering ‘x is beautiful’ is performed correctly, in which case it is a *guess*, or else

\(^{12}\) ‘I may judge that my audience deviates, by her bad taste, from the aesthetical [sic] standards of the community to which we both belong, those standards being fixed by e.g., the community’s experts.’ (Recanati 2008: 60).
(ii) the speech act is in fact assertion, but an *incorrect* one. As far as the first horn of the dilemma is concerned, note that speakers will in many cases lack the evidence about the experts’ opinion. Thus, if we conceive of the assertoric content of ‘x is beautiful’ as now referring to some other standard than the speaker’s own, we seem to lose the epistemic warranty. Accordingly, the epistemic position we would be in while attributing beauty would be no higher than when making educated (or even ‘wild’) guesses. As far as the second horn goes, we have the intuition that when attributing beauty to an object, by means of a linguistic act, we are often warranted in so doing. But since we typically do not have justification or knowledge about other people’s opinions on aesthetic matters, the speech act we perform may easily turn out to be unwarranted on many normative accounts of assertion. Clearly, both options are unacceptable: the former should be avoided as it misidentifies the nature of the speech act we typically perform when attributing beauty; and the latter is at odds with a natural assumption that beauty attributions, as linguistic acts, are typically performed correctly. This suggests, on our view, that the assertoric content of ‘x is beautiful’ does not refer to other people’s aesthetic standards.

Second, we often see that well-trained experts disagree in their aesthetic appreciations. Recanati’s account should thus offer a clear procedure of determining which of the two experts is actually fixing the relevant communal standards.

Third, we seem to be entitled in making aesthetic judgment even when we are aware that we disagree with the view prevalent among experts or relevant peers. It is not irrational nor infelicitous to utter (3):

3. Despite being unanimously disliked by audience and critics, this painting is beautiful.
However, uttering (3) is bound to be an unwarranted assertion on Recanati’s view, as the propositional content of ‘x is beautiful’ refers to the standard of the relevant expert.\textsuperscript{13}

Fourth, the problem of first-handness resurfaces for this approach. It seems that if the expert’s judgments about aesthetic value were bound to be correct, then a speaker could be warranted in attributing beauty to some object relying solely on the testimony of such experts—without the first-hand experience of the object.

Recanati is aware of some of these difficulties. In particular, he acknowledges that cases like (3) present a problem for his account. He ends his proposal by tentatively suggesting that in these cases speakers are perhaps not appealing to the standards of the community as they currently are, but rather to the way those communal standards should be developed (Recanati 2008: 60-61).\textsuperscript{14} This suggestion goes in the direction of our positive contribution, which we will present in the next section.

\textbf{V. Beauty attributions as double speech acts}

As noted above, if one restricts the analysis of ‘x is beautiful’ to doing no more than merely reporting the speaker’s aesthetic standards, one runs the risk of not satisfying our first two desiderata: disagreement and normative aspect.\textsuperscript{15}

This problem is avoided, we will argue, if attributions of beauty are characterized as typically involving not only an assertion, but also a second speech act, namely a \textit{recommendation} or a \textit{proposal}. This is the view we want to develop here.\textsuperscript{16} We will analyze

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{13}] One may claim that speakers may be systematically mistaken about the sort of speech act they are performing, but it is preferable to keep the level of ‘pragmatic blindness’ of the speakers at a minimum (it is one of our desiderata to avoid an error theory).
\item[\textsuperscript{14}] Marques (2015) develops an account of disagreement in evaluative discourse along these lines. On her view, evaluative discourse is underlain by attitudes about what we (the members of the relevant group) should be disposed to value. Disagreement may result from conflicts in these attitudes.
\item[\textsuperscript{15}] This has prompted several theorists to offer sophisticated contextualist proposals that try to overcome these problems (see the references in note 10).
\item[\textsuperscript{16}] Montminy (2012) defends a double speech act account of epistemic modals, where the second speech act is a weak suggestive. The proposal also bears similarities to hybrid expressivist views in meta-ethics (Ridge 2006)
\end{itemize}
the content of the assertoric speech act along contextualist lines so that the minimal content asserted by the speaker when attributing beauty is that the object of evaluation is beautiful relative to the speaker’s aesthetic standard. The motivation for endorsing a contextualist analysis was discussed in Sections II and III; in particular, we claimed that contextualism allows one to account for the perspective-sensitive nature of aesthetic judgments and for their first-handness.\footnote{This is also compatible with a relativist framework, and those who favor an account along these lines could combine it with our double speech act proposal.}

V.i. Aesthetic recommendations

On our account, the second speech act typically involved in attributions of beauty is a recommendation. For instance, when uttering that ‘Nocturne in blue and green is beautiful’, one does not only report that the painting is beautiful according to her aesthetic standard but implicitly also recommends to her audience that they evaluate Whistler’s painting as beautiful. The content of recommendations is not truth-evaluable: when the speaker offers a recommendation, she is not describing things as being a certain way, but rather inviting the audience to do something, to adopt a certain attitude. The recommendation will be satisfied (i.e. followed) by the addressee if she does what is recommended. Note that the content of the recommendation is not that one should see the painting, but is rather conditional upon its perception: namely that, when evaluating the painting, one should exercise a sensibility that would lead to its appraisal as beautiful.

On our view, the motivation to conceive of aesthetic attributions as implicitly conveying an additional speech act comes from considering our participation in aesthetic practice, both as speakers and as the audience. As speakers, we do not merely wish to make

\footnote{This is also compatible with a relativist framework, and those who favor an account along these lines could combine it with our double speech act proposal.}
our personal judgment of taste public, but typically intend to invite hearers to share it. Moreover, we often tend to enthusiastically engage in aesthetic disputes, especially if we are disagreeing with the other party. Yet, such disagreements cannot be explained as mere divergence in our reports on what we like, but plausibly as a stronger disinclination to accept what the speaker is recommending. This disagreement may persist even when the relevant individuals know that they have different aesthetic tastes and preferences, in the same way that we may disagree about what film to watch tonight, even if we agree on all facts about our respective tastes (see Field 2009; Marques 2015; also López de Sa 2015).

Our proposal, thus, is that recommendations are typically conveyed when making assertions about aesthetic value; that being said, the dual speech act view we wish to advocate plausibly applies to ethical statements as well (although we won’t discuss this here (see Ridge 2006)).

The illocutionary class of recommendation is that of a directive (to use Searle’s taxonomy), characterized as an attempt to get the hearer to do something (Searle 1975: 13-14). Our account, thus, bears similarities with Hare’s prescriptivism (Hare 1952; also Ridge 2013): according to Hare, evaluative (moral) statements involve a universalized prescription (e.g., the prescription not to steal unless in such and such situation). Prescriptions and recommendations, however, differ in ‘strength’ (to use another Searle’s term): while prescriptions demand that something be done, recommendations merely invite one to do what is recommended. Thus, violating a prescription will be, *prima facie*, inappropriate, whereas not following a recommendation will just be seen, at most, as unadvisable (by the speaker). There can also be variations of strength in recommendations: if I tell you that some performance is impeccable, I am clearly issuing a stronger directive than if I merely said it is adequate, and so on.
A possible worry for the present account is that it may seem that the audience does not have control over doing what this sort of recommendations proposes—namely, being disposed to having certain aesthetic responses. In general, recommendations seem to make sense only when the hearer has some control over doing what is recommended. For this reason, one cannot recommend that someone stop being allergic to dogs or start finding some food spicy, as we have no control over these things.

This worry can be allayed, however. Changing aesthetic appreciation is more of an active process than a simple case of a reactive response (e.g., finding some food spicy). One is not recommended to instantaneously change her attitude and agree with the speaker, but to engage in a process which involves a more complex behavior: getting acquainted with the object, focusing our attention on its details, trying to have a coherent global experience of the object which takes in all of its relevant features, etc.

What is recommended, thus, is that the audience is disposed to engage with the object in the same way as the speaker does, so that they get to share her aesthetic appreciation of it. And although the speaker addresses her recommendation directly to her interlocutors, such a recommendation is not limited to them: anyone who can be reached by testimonial chain is recommended to accept Whistler’s Nocturne as beautiful. In this sense, the scope of the recommendations involved in attributions of beauty is, in principle, universal. In Section 6, however, we will discuss the possibility that the universal scope might be restricted in some cases.

A further possible problem for the present account is the plausibility of recommendations in cases when the object of appraisal is destroyed or lost (and has never been observed by the audience). Arguably, it wouldn’t make much sense to recommend to someone that they assess the object as beautiful if there is no chance that such an object
could ever be encountered. There are several ways of addressing this problem, though. A first thing to note is that the relevant recommendation is *dispositional* in nature: the speaker recommends that hearers develop certain dispositions, namely, to exercise the sort of sensibility that will allow them to share the speaker’s aesthetic evaluation, *if they encounter the relevant object*. In the case of lost objects, the audience will never be in a position to engage in the complex behavior referred to above, so as to get acquainted with the object, dwell on its details, and so on.

Moreover, it may be that recommendations are associated with most, *but not all*, attributions of beauty. In general, it might be that an utterance that standardly involves the implicit performance of some speech act does not generate such a speech act in certain contexts. For instance, there are contexts where by uttering ‘Can you open the door?’ a speaker does not make a request, but only a question (even if, typically, speakers make a request by uttering this sentence). Similarly, small variations in the form of the sentence uttered may block the generation of some speech act (e.g., ‘Are you able to open the door?’ will not typically be used to make a request).\(^{18}\) In this way, it might be that when attributing beauty to lost objects, speakers do not make an additional recommendation, but merely an assertion. Likewise, it is plausible to think that utterances of the relativized sentence ‘x is beautiful to me’ do not involve a recommendation either, but only report the speaker’s standard of taste. This gives us a way to abstain from making a recommendation when attributing beauty: one can always retreat to such relativized assertions (we will come back to this point below).\(^{19}\)

---

\(^{18}\) This point is made by Montminy (2012); see also Searle (1975).

\(^{19}\) We will return to this point below.
V.ii. Normativity and disagreement

By taking attributions of beauty to involve recommendations, our account manages to satisfy the second and third desiderata specified above—that is, it allows for the possibility of disagreement and it makes room for a normative dimension in aesthetic judgment.

Let us consider normativity first. There can clearly be normative clashes between different recommendations. More specifically, such clashes will take place when recommendations are incompatible. We will say that two recommendations are incompatible, in the relevant sense, if they cannot be both followed by the same individual: in particular, this will happen if their satisfaction would require the audience to appreciate an object in ways underlain by incompatible standards or sensibilities.

The possibility of clashes among aesthetic recommendations goes a long way in meeting Zangwill’s normative requirement: ‘if you don’t get pleasure from Shakespeare's Sonnets, I will think of you as being in error—not just your judgment, but your liking’ (Zangwill 2014). On our account, however, aesthetic normative conflicts do not depend on realist commitments, thus meeting our desideratum not to undertake such commitments. In order to characterize what it is for two individuals to be in aesthetic normative conflict, it is not necessary to think of them as having different views about some alleged perspective-independent aesthetic facts: it suffices to say that their recommendations clash. Note that there does not need to be any normative conflict between two individuals who merely have different responses or dispositions—say, Ann tends to sneeze when encountering grass pollen, since she is allergic to it; John does not (see Marques 2015; also Ridge 2013). However, when two speakers make incompatible recommendations to the same audience, there is a clear intuitive sense in which they are in normative conflict. The universal nature of aesthetic judgment (highlighted by Kant) is explained in our account by the default universal scope
of aesthetic recommendations: in principle, any two individuals making an aesthetic recommendation clashing with each other will be seen as being in normative conflict.

By the same token, recommendations seem to account for disagreement as well. On our construal, the disagreement doesn’t take place primarily at the level of the content asserted, but at the level of recommendations instead. Two speakers would disagree in this sense when their attributions of beauty involve clashing recommendations. Our proposal, thus, echoes the traditional expressivist strategy of accounting for disagreement as disagreement in (non-doxastic) attitudes, rather than in the descriptive content asserted.²⁰

There is a growing literature analyzing cases of disagreement that are not explained in terms of the assertion of contradictory contents (López de Sa 2015; see also Björnsson and Almér 2009, 2010; Plunkett and Sundell 2013; Sundell 2011; Montminy 2012; Khoo 2015); in particular, there is evidence that expressions of disagreement do not always target the descriptive content semantically associated with an assertion (they may target instead implicated contents or, as in our case, non-assertive speech acts) (see Björnsson and Almér 2009; Björnsson 2015; Montminy 2012; Knobe and Yalcin 2014; Khoo 2015).

On top of this non-doxastic disagreement, recommendations arguably make room for further disagreement at the level of content. So, it is plausible to think that, when the audience takes up the speaker’s invitation, they regard themselves as engaged in a process of developing shared standards of appreciation. When this happens, the assertions made by participants in the conversation will be assessed in relation to such developing, shared standards. Of course, if the audience persists in their disagreement with the speaker, they

²⁰ See, among others, Stevenson (1963), Field (2009) and Chrisman (2007). In particular, Ridge (2013) discusses the notion of disagreement in prescriptions, which is close to disagreement in recommendations (see also Hare 1952). The strategy of appealing to conflicts in attitudes in order to account for disagreement is also pursued by contextualists such as López de Sa (2015) and Marques (2015).
will not be regarded as accepting her proposal of sharing her appreciation of the object, so it will not be assumed anymore that they are developing common standards. Another way of formulating this idea is to say that aesthetic proposals, when not directly rejected, trigger presuppositions of common standards (for a view along these lines, see López de Sa 2008; also DeRose 2004).

A question for the present account is whether aesthetic disagreements can be resolved rationally. One way of settling conflicts between incompatible aesthetic recommendations is to try to refer to a common-ground shared standard. In doing so, one draws the attention of the audience to features that might make the object beautiful relative to these common-ground standards (for instance, one can say: ‘But look, the painting uses vibrant light and soft composition’). If the other recommendation (denying beauty to the painting) cannot offer a set of features that would likewise accord to some such shared standard, it can be seen as weaker in this respect. This sort of strategy goes a long way in addressing aesthetic controversies, since typically it will be reasonable to expect that there is some such common-ground standards shared by all the participants in the conversation.

Note, however, that there are cases in which attempts to find this kind of common-ground standards fail; when this happens, it seems that there is no way of giving reasons supporting one recommendation over the competing alternatives. At best, one could engage in what we may call aesthetic persuasion: an attempt to present the object under what one takes to be the most favorable light, with the hope that the audience will eventually come to develop the required sensibility (see Shusterman 1986).

Alternatively, if even this fails, one may retreat to the bare, speaker-relative report, now withdrawing the accompanying recommendation or proposal; e.g., one may say ‘Well, the picture is beautiful for me: we clearly have different tastes’. In this way, the speaker
will only make one speech act, that of an assertion concerning the standards of the speaker, without the corresponding recommendation.\textsuperscript{21}

The dialectics of aesthetic controversies bears resemblances to Kuhn’s account of the evolution of scientific practices (Kuhn [1962] 1996). For instance, there were arguably no shared common-ground sensibilities in the 1870s that could help impressionists convince the art critics about the merits of their work. On the contrary, they precisely violated most of what was accepted as valuable in art, inviting harsh criticism and yet introducing new aesthetic values. In other words, the emergence of the impressionists can be seen as a start of a ‘revolutionary’ period, as opposed to what may be analogous to Kuhn’s ‘normal science’.\textsuperscript{22} When a paradigm is overturned, the change is not driven by reasons, but rather by processes of persuasion, in which individuals come to develop the relevant sensibilities.

\section*{VI. Aesthetic recommendations and interpersonal coordination}

We have claimed that, in addition to an assertion, attributions of beauty typically involve a second speech act—a recommendation proposing the audience to share the speaker’s aesthetic evaluation of the object. Given that statements attributing other kinds of response-dependent properties, such as warmth, do not seem to generate these recommendations, it is interesting to explain why aesthetic assertions behave differently. Our suggestion is that

\textsuperscript{21} An interesting possibility (which we discuss in Section 6) is that when recalcitrant, radical disagreement takes place, the disagreeing party may be excluded from the scope of the speaker’s future aesthetic proposals: they would have different sensibilities and to that extent, they do not belong to the relevant community of peers.

\textsuperscript{22} One may argue that the analogy with Kuhn’s work has its limits as, unlike in science, artists can ‘go back’ to the values common to periods before the paradigm shift. This claim can be contested, however, at least in some cases: perhaps we are not in a position to appreciate silent movies as cinema aficionados were in the 1920s.
attributions of aesthetic values involve such recommendations because of the role the aesthetic practices play in fostering and enhancing interpersonal coordination and communal cohesion.

It is often claimed that aesthetic activities are driven by human’s disposition towards sociability, and in particular by our inclination to collective attunement (Davies 2012; Dissanayake 2000; Boyd 2009; Mithen 2005; Brown 2000; Egan 2010). Furthermore, it is plausible to argue that aesthetic practices contribute to promoting and developing social bonding and coordination (Dissanayake 1988, 2000; Boyd 2009; Tooby and Cosmides 2001; Coe 2003).

Brian Boyd has stressed the relevance of interpersonal attunement for art. He argues that aesthetic practices are constituted by devices for the engagement and manipulation of attention (Boyd 2009; see also Coe 2003: 76). In particular, artistic activities would seek and promote the sharing of attention among individuals—something that would be advantageous for cooperation and group coordination.

In a similar way, Ellen Dissanayake has highlighted the intertwining between art and ritual behavior. On her proposal, aesthetic practices have their roots in the context of social ceremonies where exaggerated, ‘ritualized’ patterns of behavior are deployed with the aim of attracting and shaping attention in coordinated ways. According to Dissanayake, the ritualized behavior underpinning art contributes to the strengthening of social bonds, communal cohesion and the reinforcement of cooperation (Dissanayake 1988, 1992, 2000; also Brown 2000).

---

23 Marques (2015) also appeals to social coordination mechanisms in order to account for disagreement in evaluative discourse in general.

24 Kirschner and Tomasello (2010) argue that joint musical behavior fosters subsequent cooperation and collective action in 4-year-old children.
Interestingly, Dissanayake has argued that artistic practices find a precursor in the engaged interactions between babies and caretakers, more specifically in the dyadic, conversation-like interactions between adult and infant which are commonly known as ‘baby talk’ (see Reddy 2008; Trevarthen 1979; Dissanayake 2000). The patterned, stylized interactions constituting baby talk allow the infant and the adult to attune their attention and attitudes, and constitute the basis for the development of full-fledged interpersonal coordinative and communicative skills (see Reddy 2008; Mall and Dissanayake 2003). Dissanayake suggests that aesthetic social practices lead to communal attunement by exploiting (and sophisticating) the same sort of strategies for sharing attention already involved in the achievement of coordination and emotional bonding in baby talk (see Dissanayake 2000; Mall and Dissanayake 2003; also Boyd 2009 and Trevarthen 2009).

Given the central place that the promotion of social coordination seems to occupy in aesthetic practices, it is highly plausible to think that aesthetic assertions come hand in hand with recommendations to engage in shared appreciation of the relevant artwork. In general, individuals involved in aesthetic discourse strive to achieve interpersonal coordination; this coordination is not just a precondition of aesthetic discourse (as in the view presented by López de Sa [2008]), but rather something such a discourse aims at. The recommendations implicitly made when attributing aesthetic values contribute to forwarding such coordination.

We are suggesting, therefore, that our attributions of beauty involve an invitation to the audience to join us in our aesthetic experience, because our participation in aesthetic activities, both as producers and as consumers, is underlain by a strong disposition to align our attitudes with those of others, to attune our sensibilities and develop a common way of seeing things. The sort of recommendations or proposals we are positing as a second speech
act is often made in more direct ways: we often say ‘Look at this picture, isn’t it beautiful?’, or ‘I am sure you will really like this song’. These proposals—in their implicit and more explicit forms—are motivated by our almost compulsive drive towards the interpersonal attunement of aesthetic attitudes (this drive is discussed by Dissanayake 2000; Miall and Dissanayake 2003; Boyd 2009).

Sometimes the audience will refuse to play along with the speaker’s proposal, or will make a conflicting one; in these cases, the audience and the speaker will typically try to find a way to restore coordination among their attitudes (perhaps by reaching some common-ground shared sensibility), so as to overcome their state of disagreement. This accounts, at least to a large extent, for the normative dimension of aesthetic discourse, as we have argued in the previous section.

VI.i. Aesthetic coordination and group identity

The attunement of aesthetic attitudes has a direct role in group identification and bonding. By engaging in shared aesthetic appreciation, individuals reinforce their sense of belonging to a community (Boyd 2009; Coe 2003; Prinz 2014; Egan 2010; Marques 2015; also Cohen 1978). Common aesthetic sensibilities mark membership to the group and strengthen group cohesion. 25 The sense of group identity may be emphasized by explicitly distinguishing members of the group from outsiders. In this way, members of close-knit, alternative subcultures may endorse aesthetic views that are explicitly at odds with the prevailing attitudes among the general public. Prinz (2014) has described the dynamics of inclusion

25 Several authors argue that marking group membership and strengthening group bonds is important for human communities because it fosters cooperation, solidarity and altruistic joint action. See Coe (2003), Boyd (2009) and Tooby and Cosmides (2001, 2010).
and exclusion shaping group identity, in relation to the example of punk music (which explicitly adopts aesthetic values that oppose the conventional, mainstream ones).

The affiliative character of aesthetic practices, and its contribution to establishing the identity of (sub-)communities, raises interesting questions about the universality of aesthetic judgment. In general, when making an aesthetic assertion, the speaker’s invitation extends to all her aesthetic peers—all those that she considers as part of her community. We have assumed so far that, by default, this community will be understood in a broadest sense, so that the invitation has universal scope. But, sometimes, the speaker will only be aiming to share her attitudes with the members of some specific sub-community, a sub-community whose members are seen by the speaker as having a similar sensibility to hers. In these cases, the speaker will only be concerned about the potential coordination of attitudes with members of this sub-community and will disregard or take for granted (or even relish) divergences with the attitudes of outsiders.

A possible view is that in these cases, the scope of the speaker’s recommendation is restricted and targets only members of the relevant sub-group. Challenges from outsiders would be dismissed as coming from someone with defective sensibilities, someone who is not in a position to see things in the same way as the speaker and her peers (e.g., think of old-fashioned parents and their punk-loving teenage offspring). When the scope of the recommendation is restricted, members of the sub-community and outsiders would be talking past each other, rather than genuinely disagreeing. According to this view, therefore, one would expect that members of the relevant sub-community will tend to retreat to relativized assertions not involving recommendations when directly addressing...

---

26 Marques (2015: 10) acknowledges that this is a consequence of her explanation of disagreement in terms of conflicting first-personal plural attitudes.
outsiders (e.g., ‘Well, this music is great if you are into punk’). Plausibly, when a speaker makes a *non-relativized* attribution of beauty directly addressing some outsider, her utterance will carry the presupposition that the scope of the implicit recommendation includes the addressee (so that disagreement may take place). Of course, it will be a flexible, dynamic matter whether some individual belongs to the group targeted by the recommendations of a given speaker: changes in the context may lead to widening or narrowing the scope of the speaker’s recommendations, so that individuals previously excluded are now included in the target audience (remember that, in default cases, recommendations would be issued with a universal scope, that is, targeting the community of speakers in general).

An alternative view is to maintain that the scope of aesthetic recommendations always remains universal, allowing in all cases for disagreement between two sub-communities radically divergent in their aesthetic tastes. While it may be that in certain situations the speaker aims to coordinate her attitudes only with the members of her specific sub-community, on this view such a restrictive outlook will not be factored in the linguistic act itself. Thus, although challenges from outsiders might be dismissed as coming from someone with defective sensibilities, the recommendation itself has an unchanged universal scope. This second view, therefore, leaves room for disagreement between groups with very different sensibilities, while being compatible with the claim that conflicts will tend to be less robust in these cases: since individuals will not aim to coordinate their attitudes with members of such distant groups, they will tend to quickly abandon disputes with such outsiders (by disregarding their diverging views as defective or too dissimilar).  

---

27 See Egan (2010: 260): ‘Sensible disputes will become fewer and farther between the farther our interlocutors get from our close cultural and biological neighbors, and the closer they get to the Martians’. 
So, if one wants to preserve in all cases the possibility of disagreement between dissimilar groups, the last view will be preferred. At any rate, this is an interesting question that deserves further discussion, and that reveals that the normativity of aesthetic discourse depends in complex and nuanced ways on the social role played by aesthetic practices.

One may wonder whether other forms of evaluative speech involve recommendations like the ones we have examined in the case of aesthetic discourse. The answer, we submit, will be determined by whether those evaluative practices play a role in fostering social coordination similar to that played by aesthetic activities. So, in most communities, promoting the coordination of our tastes is not a central aspect of, say, ice-cream eating practices. Such practices are typically not driven by the disposition towards interpersonal attitude coordination. Thus, preference of one ice-cream flavor over the other is usually seen as a question of personal idiosyncrasy and, being such, disagreements about the best ice-cream taste tend to be dropped quickly, as not resting on anything more substantial. It may be argued that something similar happens in general with questions about gastronomic tastes. Although there may be some disposition to align our attitudes about food (see Marques and García-Carpintero 2014), such a disposition does not seem to be as strong as in the case of aesthetic activities: contributing to the interpersonal coordination of attitudes would not play as big a part in gastronomic practices as in aesthetic ones. Consequently, the normative dimension of gastronomic discourse is not as strong as in the aesthetic case. This point is also made by Zangwill, who notes that the normative aspirations of aesthetic discourse are absent, or are substantially toned down, in gastronomic speech:

For judgments of the niceness and nastiness of food and drink do not make the same claim to correctness as do judgments of beauty and ugliness. Maybe they
make some such claim, but certainly nothing as robust as those judgments of beauty and ugliness claim. (Zangwill 2003: 73)\textsuperscript{28}

Now, it would of course be possible that gastronomy started to play a social role analogous to that of aesthetic practices; indeed, it is an open question to what extent certain gastronomic activities do actually play such a role. Think of wine tasting or some forms of high cuisine: at least in some communities, these practices seem to contribute to reinforcing social cohesion and group identity. It is not surprising, then, that speech about these gastronomic activities incorporates, at least to some degree, the sort of normative flavor characteristic of aesthetic discourse (see Marques and García-Carpintero 2014); for instance, people may strongly disagree over the quality of different wines, and there are countless competitions aimed at settling such issues.

Summing up, our claim is that aesthetic assertions are typically accompanied by (implicit) recommendations or proposals because of the drive towards attitude coordination that underpins aesthetic practices in general (even if, of course, not every instance of aesthetic behavior is motivated by the disposition towards social attunement). People tend to regard the sort of sensibility and values manifested in aesthetic speech as constituting an important part of their identity as individuals and members of our community, so they will be eager to align them with those whom they consider their peers.

\textbf{VII. Conclusion}

\textsuperscript{28} See also Egan (2010: 251): ‘Disputes about gustatory taste - about what’s tasty, for example - are comparatively fragile. It doesn’t take that much to convince us that such a dispute isn’t worth engaging in. Disputes about the aesthetic value of literary works are much more robust’. 
We have tried to argue that beauty attributions of the form ‘x is beautiful’ should be analyzed as a double speech act: a report that x is beautiful relative to the speaker’s aesthetic standard and a recommendation that the audience should accept x as beautiful. In so doing, we hope to have satisfied five desiderata, namely, to have accounted for (i) the experiential nature of aesthetic judgment (first-handness in our terms), (ii) disagreement in aesthetic debates and (iii) normative dimension present in disputes over beauty attributions, as well as to have avoided an appeal to (iv) error theory and (v) realist ontological commitments. In particular, one of the merits of our proposal can be seen in its dealing neatly with both (i) and (ii) and (iii), unlike invariantist solutions who are equipped to account for (ii) and (iii) but not (i), and some contextualist proposals who can explain (i) without (ii) and (iii).

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank Manuel García-Carpintero and Sven Rosenkrantz for their comments on earlier versions of the paper. The material was presented at the European Society for Aesthetics conference in Barcelona, the LOGOS Seminar and the LOGOS graduate reading group and we are grateful to the audience for their feedback (especially Nils Franzén). This work was supported by a grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN), the DGI projects FFI2010–16049, FFI2013-47948, FFI2014-57258-P and FFI2011-23267, as well as an FPI-UNED grant and an AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya grant (2009SGR–1077).

References


Plunkett, David, & Sundell, Timothy. ‘Disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative terms’. Philosopher's Imprint, 13, no. 23 (2013).


